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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the allocation of policy influences at the national, state, and local levels of government. A theory of what causes a change from a decentralized to a more centralized system is developed and whether and how such a theory of change is related to a theory of the origins of a federal system is explored. The author presents several weaknesses and ambiguities in the theory presented by Beer and others that modernization and the forces of economic and political development are the driving forces which cause changes in society, which in turn prompts centralization of government activity. One of the weaknesses is that the almost exclusive emphasis on economic change gives the modernization theory an almost deterministic tone. Another weakness is that this strong emphasis on economic change assumes a constancy of a political culture which presumes that changes in society will be reacted to and changed. The author argues that centralization is not caused by modernization ad economic forces, but by man's conceptions of causality and justice. Societies change their structure of power and decision making because of changing perceptions and norms. Ideas matter. He argues that man is not a passive creature merely passing wealth into policy in some invariant, mechanical way, but that there are real political struggles derived from ideas which influence policy. (Author/RM)

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THE USES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE ALLOCATION OF POLICY INFLUENCE AMONG LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

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History Is The History Of The Human Mind

George Will

Introduction

The allocation of policy influences among levels of government is a matter of great political importance in our society. The pattern of allocation which is utilized is of significance because differences in this pattern are presumed to enhance or thwart particular values, and to produce different policy effects. Decentralized policy determination is presumed to produce varied policies which will be in accord with varying population preferences.[1] This decentralization is also viewed as a way of insulating wealth from demands of the larger society.[2] Moving to centralization of policy determination is presumed to open up influence channels to groups which are limited in a decentralized system,[3] and to produce a more nationalized, standardized society. The significance of this allocational question has been seen most vividly in the struggles over civil rights in which a primary question was whether centralized uniformity should dominate over decentralized variation.

Given the persistent disputes over this question, it is of considerable significance that it is generally agreed that over time there has been an increase in the centralization of policy determination. The United States started as a highly decentralized federal system in which much more policy determination and influence is conducted at the national level. That pattern of chance represents the focus of this analysis, and raises a fundamental question about our society. What is it that prompts a society to reject state

and local autonomy and establish a massive national government to try and influence state and local policies?

There are essentially two perspectives on this question. They may be summarized as the economic development and political culture perspectives. The former stresses that objective changes in economic and social situations prompts corresponding adaptive changes in political arrangements. The latter stresses that societies change their political arrangements because of subjective political culture changes. This view presumes that political arrangements and policy situations are reflective of political value choices, and that as a society's conception of social causality and distributive justice change, political choices change. While it will ultimately be argued here that these two perspectives are not competing, but complementary, they will be presented initially as such. The differences between these two perspectives are important to articulate not only for this question, but because they deal with the more fundamental questions of what prompts a society to change, and to do anything. Political science has been heavily influenced by theories which stress the primacy of economic development, and their not-so-latent implications of economic determinism. The validity of that perspective is crucial to the issue of centralization and to the larger question of Societal Action. Thus, while the explanatory focus here will be centralization, it is really only a subset of the larger question of the determinants of Human Political Policies.

The attempt here will be to develop a theory of what causes a change from a decentralized to a more centralized system. In

addition, this analysis will explore a secondary question of whether and how such a theory of change is related to a theory of the origins of a federal system. Most theories of origination and change of federal systems have been presented as separate and distinct, and there is some question of whether this is logical.

To pursue these questions, the dependent variable of this analysis, centralization, will first be analyzed to discuss its manifestations. The economic development and political culture perspectives will be presented. Then their relationships will be explicitly discussed, and the different predictions of each will be formalized.

Finally, some more general implications of the theories and their differences will be discussed.

CENTRALIZATION

The federal political system, as originally created in the United States, was a decentralized policy determination system. This decentralization was achieved through two primary and related means. One is to assign particular functions to states and localities, and the other is to give these subnational units autonomy in handling these functions.[4] Federalism is also characterized by, or based on giving representation to each state within the whole, but one of the primary mechanisms of maintaining decentralization has been by having policy execution or delivery handled autonomously by subunits. It is in the policy determination and execution area, and not in the representational area, that centralization has taken

place. Within this area there are two different routes through which centralization of the political system can take place, and it is important to establish both mechanisms so that it will be clear just what centralization means. The two routes are to reassign functional responsibility to a higher level, or to alter the level at which control or decision-making for a functional area takes place. The former alters the structural division of labor in the system, while the latter maintains the formal delivery division of labor, but reduces subunit control or autonomy of policy selection. Both constitute centralization of policy determination in the political system.

The first approach has been taken place in many states with states assuming responsibility for welfare payments[5] and property assessments, for example.[6] It has less formally taken place between states and the national government with Congress assuming responsibility for setting national minimums in the areas of civil rights and pollution, though state and local policy execution still plays a role here. The alternative approach is to maintain subnational delivery, and have higher units attempt to influence policy decisions in subunits. This can be done thorough fiscal aids,[7] or directives which attempt to influence policy outcomes.[8] In comparing the two, the transfer for responsibility for a function to a higher level should be regarded as a more effective centralization means. It allows for more effective policy delivery control because it reduces supra unit reliance on subunit execution, which give subunits possibilities of creating policy variations.[9]

In speaking of the increase in centralization in the American federal system, the term applies to both forms of centralization. Though there has been no systematic study of the relative usage of each of these forms, it appears that the practice has been to rely on both methods simultaneously. In states, for example, the proportion of state-local expenditures by states has increased over time, while the proportion of local funds from external sources has also increased. The functional shift approach does not involve any greater interactions between levels of government, while the other route means that there will be an increase in interactions, or in intergovernmental relations. Centralization, then, need not necessarily involve more intergovernmental relations, though it appears to have in the United States. Despite their differences, though, both of these mechanisms are reflections of the process of centralization of policy determination, and both are the object of this analysis.

The Economic and Political Development Perspective

The economic and political development perspective on centralization is derived from general theories of economic and political development, and has been most throughly presented by Beer.[10] The central idea to this perspective is that modernization and the "forces of economic and political development" are the driving forces which cause changes in society, which in turn prompts centralization of government activity.[11] The primary mechanism of this modernization is that there are increases in differentiation and scale, which result in increasing societal complexity.[12]

These changes produce a society with greater nationwide unification and standardization, which are the background conditions for governmental centralization to take place.[13] These changes are not a sufficient explanation of centralization, though. The cumulative phases of modernization also tend to produce structural features which produce different political coalitions, each of which has an effect on centralization.[14] The situation of low interdependence and scale prompts porkbarrel politics, as the extent of spatial variation among subunits limits political agreements to agreeing to jointly "raid the treasury." As interdepence and scale increase, externalities are generated and coalitions form around enlarging (centralizing) the scale of government to cope with these changes. The continuation of economic development produces clear class differentiations, and creates class coalitions seeking to redistribute resources. Finally, continued economic development generates an extensive technology and its own technocracy, which seeks centralization in its pursuit of applying general knowledge to society. All of these phases are viewed as cumulative and still present as continuing forces for centralization.

The essential feature of this perspective is that economic change is the primary force behind centralization. Economic change restructures society and creates political groupings which were not previously in existence or well-differentiated. The emphasis in this perspective is that it is changes in objective societal situations which prompt change, and it is a perspective which has been presented by others.[15] This emphasis is seen in that the link between economic change and political centralization lies

primarily in changes in the scale and interdependence of society. Societal action is purposeful in this scheme only in that the national government is reacting to and adapting to changes in the scale of society so that there will be some rough correspondence between economic and political scale.

Critique: There are several potential weaknesses with this application of the modernization thesis to explain centralization. They revolve largely around the presumptions of his theory. The first two points deal with assumptions. First, like most of the economic and political development literature, the almost exclusive emphasis on economic change gives the theory an almost deterministic tone.[16] If Economic development alone is primary, then the vast range of political debates surrounding centralization apparently become inconsequential, a mere residual sideshow on the way to greater centralization.[17] Second, and closely related, is that this strong emphasis on economic change apparently assumes a constancy of a political culture which presumes that changes in society will be reacted to and changed. It does not presume or downplays that political reactions are contigent upon human conceptions of man's relation to his enviroment, or conceptions of distributive justice. When ideas are acknowledged in Beer's theory, they too are products of continued economic development, and only play an accentuating role in the latter stages of economic development.[18]

There are also some ambiguities in his theory which should be noted. These ambiguities might be called validity questions.

First, theory he presents is about changes in both scope and scale of government, and there is some question of whether theories of these changes are validly equivalent to a theory of centralization. While they seem very similar, the theory presumes that public sector growth necessarily is associated with centralization and the equivalence assumed here needs to be made more explicit.

There is also a question about the generalizability of his theory to the origins of a federal system. No mention is made of whether the theory also applies to the origins of such a system. If this theory is relevant to the origins of such a system, this theory would presumably suggest that the decentralized system originally established was simply a function of the economic scale of the society at the time of formation. This would be in conflict with the general conclusion that the American system was the result of a political compromise.[19] If the explanations of origins and change are different, then this suggests that a system created as a political arrangement has its subsequent fate determined largely by economic change. Whichever of these is intended, it should be made explicit.

There is one final question of generalizability of the theory, and involves the generalizability of this theory of change across different political systems. The question here is whether the context of change matters. As Beer notes, the modernization perspective is an explanation of growth in the public sector, and the type of system this takes place in is of little consequence.[20] If so, there is an uneasy sense in reading his theory that federalism has been of little significance (except for porkbarrel practices),

and that all systems eventually converge.[21] This leads to the conclusion that politics (in the sense of unitary vs federal systems) doesn't seem to matter. The implication is that his theory of political system change is such a generalized statement that the context of federalism is insignificant. The important question which is neglected here is the relationship between centralization and federalism.

A Political Interpretation of Change

The argument to be presented here as an alternative is that the creation and alteration of a federal system is a political act. Man creates political arrangements according to his conceptions of causality and justice, and alters these arrangements as his conceptions of these change.[22] The actions of society are "organized with reference to systems of ultimate meaning," which are combinations of subjective perceptions of the forces governing reality and values,[23] and as these change, societies generate "logics of action" and change. The specific changes which are relevant here are those from a theistic to an individualistic to a socio-economic environment sense of the cause of human outcomes. These changes have interacted with the value of equality in America society to produce significant pressures for centralization within the federal system. The context of federalism is of significance because these pressures for centralization and uniformity are directly in conflict with the decentralization of policy determination characteristic of dederal systems. There is a uniformity of explanation to the creation and gradual abandonment of decentralization, though, in that the change represents a variation from a desire

for low to high political mobilization as the corresponding desire to effect socio-economic environments uniformly varied. Within this perspective, objective social condition changes have significance and produce political action only in the context of particular belief systems. This perspective is in effect an examination of secularization with application to one particular area.

God, man, and inequality: The theistic interpretation of the sources of human outcomes stresses that God is the determinant of one's fate, and man is left to simply try and demonstrate his designation.[24] This belief system has significant implications for political action and systems. If outcomes are the result of forces beyond man, then man and his collective society have no ability or logical reason to take organized action to affect outcomes. Inequality is also not man made, or alterable. The only actions justified to cope with inequality of outcomes in this situation is for individuals to make charitable actions, but only to ease the impact of poverty and not to alter its causes.[25] There is not only no logical for organized political action, but there is no reason to pursue uniformity of environment because the environment has no relevance for the effect God has on man. The result is that with such beliefs predominat, there is no reason to pursue uniform organized political activity. There is no subjective meaning to such action.

This situation was predominant, though not exclusively so, in the formative stages of the United States political system. The primary concerns at that time were a fear of the centralization

of political power,[26] a desire to establish a minimally unified political system for reasons of economic growth and security,[27] and a desire to respect and tolerate diversity of social, economic, and political situations.[28] The result was the unique creation of the federal system.[29] The establishment of this system is a reflection of the logic of action dominant at that time which provided no basis for a highly mobilized, uniform political system. The organization of political society at the time was a function of the dominant system of meaning and its logic at the time.

Individualism: The process of secularization from theistic to individual interpretations of human causality has significant implications for politics because it creates the notion that man has the ability to control himself. It creates the notion of the dominance of the human will and effort. Man can exert effect on his world. The logic of action created by this system of thought is limited, though. The source of individual success is internal, independent of social conditions.[30] The role of the political system, as seen by radical individualism and social darwinists, was to maintain the "rules of the game" for individual effort. Laissez-faire dominated thought, and actions of the government were to affect the context of action, and not the fate of distinct individuals.[31] The essence of this system of thought was that individuals should not be helped if they failed. Not only did Horatio Alger rise from his circumstances, but the inverse "law" always present in that example is that if success comes from internal factors, efforts directed at the environments of individuals would be futile.[32] If environments make no difference, there is

obviously no reason in this system to be concerned with uniformity of environments: it will make no difference. The logic of action which emerges from this pattern of thought is one in which the only political activity justified is to try and effect the capitalistic context of individual activity and not individuals. Given that the needs of political units vary, there is a strong basis of support for porkbarrel politics. Objective changes in conditions are reacted to very selectively, with only those affecting the growth of capitalism being focused on. Actions which would affect individuals, but would disrupt capitalism, such as "correcting" pollution levels, have no basis of support. The result is a rise in centralized political activity, but primarily to mobilize resources to redistribute to subunits.

Socio-Economic Environment Causality: The rise of the conception that man is a function of his environment, his social class, and just "chance" has had profound implications for government activity and for federalism. If man is a function of his environment, and equality is a strongly held value, then there will be a logic-off-action which justifies societal action to try and equalize the effects of the environment upon individuals, and to alleviate the results of past environmental effect.[33] There are significant questions of distributive justice involved as society tries to adapt a distribution system geared to individuals to the belief that "innate" individual factors are not the sole cause of distributive shares. These efforts have been implemented by government because it is perceived as the best collective action taking institution. One of the most striking aspect of this logic

of action is that while the major tyrant man has historically feared has been governmental power, this belief system contains within it the implication that the most damaging tyrant many individuals face is the very society (and its accompany life chances) they are born into, and that government action is their only way out.

This last change has the most signigicant implications for federalism. One of the essential features of federalism is diversity of public policies among subunits according to variations in political preferences. The logic of action of environmental causality combined with a belief in equality creates strong pressures for uniformity of public policies across subunits, for without that equality there will be variations in life outcomes which will not be due to individual traits. These pressures run directly contrary to the diversity aspect of federalism, and create strong pressures for centralization to create this uniformity. Should Mississippi, for example, be allowed to not enforce civil rights, pollution laws, and not enroll in Medicaid and Medicaire if it is perceived that the effect will be to produce clearly and anticipated disadvantaged people? That question has generally been answered no due to equality norms, and has resulted in significant centralization of policy determination. The greater government activity, then, is in response to societal desires to counteract environmental influences. The centralization at the national level is because of a desire to achieve uniformity of policy.

The Composition of Culture: While these cultural changes have been presented sequentially, as if each successive change has

replaced the previous one, they should more appropriate be seen as cumulative additions to the culture, with each earlier belief system fading very slowly, and certainly not completely in the case of individualism.[34] In addition, while the theistic interpretation of causality seems to have steadily declined, and the environmental effects interpretation has generally risen in significance over time, it has also periodically lost favor as an interpretation. This has clearly shown up in social work,[35] and the debate over the extent or limits of human responsibility is a fundamental question now. The importance of these fluctuations is that these belief changes should not be viewed as linear secular trends with each inexorably and steadily replacing the former dominant belief system. There appear to be cyclical patterns in the changes in belief systems. Abrupt changes also take place, as with the Great Depression, which might be viewed as a mass "reality-testing" in which the validity of an individual level explanation was called into question with such high levels of unemployment in existence.[36]

The Significance of Federalism

The processes of change in belief systems described here are not unique to federal systems. What, then, is likely to be the differences between federal and unitary systems in the way the effects of these changes take place. The process of centralization is likely to be much more conflict ridden, slower and more negotiation oriented in a federal system. These differences will stem from the representational system of federalism and the tradition and continuing pattern of subunit policy delivery and autonomy in a federal system.

The representation system of federalism will, as Elazar notes, require not just a majority in the system for action, but a "majority of majorities."[37] This means that unless political culture changes occur evenly across subunits, the aggregation of political preferences through subunits will not likely be equivalent to the aggregation of a simple majority. The result is likely to be that for equivalent cultural changes in unitary and federal systems, the rate and extent of centralization will consistently tend to be less in the federal system. The effect of federalism is thus to alter aggregation rules and slow down centralization processes.

These same representatives, being from and tied to their respective states, are likely to be very concerned about the continuation of implementation <u>through</u> their state political systems. The representatives tend to desire to produce policies which are compatible with their unique state characteristics, and do not force policies on their states. This combined with the utilization of existing bureaucracies tends to produce a negotiation, bargaining process of centralization among federal bureaucrats and state agencies which will further slow down centralization and reduce the extent of it that actually takes place.[38] The effect of federalism, then, appears to be that of an intervening or contextual effect in which the effect of the processes of belief changes upon centralization are slowed and reduced due to federalism. The centralization which does take place may produce variations such as dual, marble-cake, picket-fence, or bamboo federalism, but as long as the essential features of spatial representation and reliance on subunit implementation remain it will remain a federal system.

Formalizing The Models

The differences between the alternative theories can be seen by formalizing the theories and contrasting them. Formalizing someone else's model can only be done tentatively, but hopefully it will be generally valid and help in clarifying differences. The essential characteristic of the modernization approach is that economic development is the primary force. This then generates changes in scale, differentiation, and interdependence. These structural variations prompt political coalitions, which pursue centralized power to obtain their goals. This (apparently) is meant to imply the following model:



Figure 1: Modernization Model

There is also a feedback process in this model, in that the policies which each coalitions pursues tend to produce subsequent structural changes.[39]

The alternative model presented here assumes that belief system changes as a part of political culture changes prompt government activity. This change will lead to greater degrees of centralization as the value placed on equality increases. It would also seem that for any given level of equality desires, the pressures toward centralization will be greater the greater the actual variation in between subunit (states or localities) policies, and the greater the awareness of these inequalities (which is to say that the development of mass communication systems will have an impact.) Within this

scheme, the effects of economic changes such as scale or interdependence on centralization will be contigent upon the logic of action at the time of economic change. Changes in interdependence which effect the ability of capitalism to function would have an impact only if at least an individualistic belief system existed. Other changes, such as health problems, lead to centralization in an attempt to effect individual environments only if there is a environmental-causality notion in existence. The important and complicating aspect of this model is that the impact of many changes on centralization is conditional upon many of the characteristics of the society. Individuals are presumed to take action for centralization under particualr logics of action only if they hold certain values, and see that the realization of those conditions does not exist.

The conditionality which is a part of this model makes its symbolic representation much more difficult. The modernization model just presented is apparently invariant, or independent of such conditions, which makes its representation much SIMPLER .[40] The model presented here is tentative, therefore. In terms of causal analysis, this model can be viewed as:



Figure 2
Model Of Centralization
Note: Arrows to arrows indicate conditionality of effects of independent variables.

These relationships can be represented by the following equation:

For:

Y= Degree of centralization

X_1= Belief system (from theistic to environmental causality)

X_2= Strength of equality value

X_3= Inequality in system (between units)

X_4= Communicated awareness of inequality

X_5= Economic change (scale, interdependence, differentiation)

$$Y= X_1 X_2 X_3 X_4 + X_5 X_1$$

Table 1

Relations For Model Of Centralization[41]

Some of the differences between the models have already been discussed, but one point should be made explicit. They are not necessarily conflicting or competing with regard to economic development being a source of centralization. The difference is in the invariance assumed in the modernization model for belief systems. Belief system change is a part of most modernization models,[42] but in that model it is apparently assumed to VARY with economic development. The alternative model presented here leaves their relationship as undefined (and obviously in great need of exploration.) The differences in these models on this point is somewhat like the difference between inductive and decuctive approaches. The belief system model is decuctive in that action follows from principles. That is, given certain values, with certain conditions, centralization action will result as purposive Human Behavior. A modernization

approach which stresses economic development is, from the perspective of the belief system model, inductive in that it associates eocnomic development and centralization and assumes (potentially falsely) causality.

The implications of the different models are important. Economic development should not be a good predictor of centralization according to the belief system model. This should show up across time for the United States, and across subunits of the system if they vary in political culture. States in which a culture which stresses environmental causality should have more active governments. They should also have undertaken more centralization, either in the form of transferring functions or intervening in subunits.[43] The implications of the belief system model for predicting reactions to economic changes of externalites are important to note also. The belief that it is simply the scale of activities, and their externalities, which determines their degree of centralization fails to account for all those activities which produce externalities, but for which centralization has not followed.[44] The belief system model would predict that centralization will be contigent upon the desire to correct inequities in the society. Thus many externalities such as crime in adjoining areas or poor schools have not resulted in larger scope governments because the desire to "correct" those is not strong.[45]

One further implication is the interpretation of the rise of professionals. The modernization interpretation regards them as outgrowths of economic development, and these professionals then pursue even further centralization. The belief perspective regards

them as reflective of a desire to have centralized policy administered in a uniform fashion,[46] often distributing benefits according to need. That is, this large group of bureaucrats are an embodiement of the logic of action which suggests that if society is to be altered, it must be done on a large scale, full-time basis.[47]

Finally, the theories differ in their interpretation of change. The advent of revenue sharing, for example, is viewed by Beer as "inherent in a certain stage of the development of the welfare state."[48] This is because economic growth promotes professionalism which produces centralization which produces an intergovernmental lobby which produces decentralization.[49] The belief model would suggest that the emphasis in explaining revenue sharing should be on changing political opinions, and, as Beer notes, a rise (perhaps as part of another cyclical swing) in conservative views, which usually emphasize individualism.[50] The significance of this conservatism is that many federal programs were designed to encourage distribution to or responses to need (on the basis of the logic of action of the environmental causality notion) and distributing funds without strings is reflective of a lessening of the desire to continue forcing such distributions. While the economic development theory seems to predict that continued development will result in further centralization, the belief perspective would predict that centralization is contigent upon the continued spread of the environmental causality idea.

Some Evidence

The evidence on the questions raised here is limited, but it does provide some basis for distinguishing between the theories. The preceding discussion of political culture presents at least significant roles for belief systems and their impact: How do they effect policy actions in general, how do they effect governmental policy, and how do they effect centralization. In all three cases, the theory presented here is that belief systems will have more to do with predicting policy than economic development, and that a relationship between beliefs and policy will exist independent of levels of economic development. That is, societies do things because of beliefs, not because of their level of economic development.

There is some evidence on these questions which were prompted by Elazar's observations on political culture variations across states.[51] These studies have revolved around the influence of different religious groups and their world views. As the emphasis in these studies is upon variations among religions (and not from religion to secularization), they do not exactly measure the independent variable of interest here. But the variation focused on is primarily the variation of whether government ought to be active in creating agencies to deal with policy and how interventionist government ought to be in actively creating policy states in society, and both of these are very similar to the belief system variation discussed here.

On the most general level, Fairbanks finds that policies for gambling and liquor use are made according to religious beliefs,

and that this relationship exist independently of levels of economic development.[52] It has also been found by Sharkansky, constructing an index from Elazar's designations, that the greater the moralism composition of a state, controlling for per capita income, the greater state activism and expenditure in a number of areas.[53] Johnson has done a similar analysis and found the same results.[54] Hutcheson and Taylor examine the relationship of dundamentalism to policy variables controlling for income levels, and vice versa, and they find that the partial correlation of fundamentalism to policy is much greater than that for income level to policy.[55] Finally, Wirt has examined the question more directly, and found that a political culture factor has a relatively greater impact in explaining variance in school centralization than economic factors.[56] This evidence is sketchy and limited, but it does offer some interesting evidence that culture and the ideas of man do make a difference in determining policy, and that these relationships exist independent of economic development. The evidence does support the idea that societies (states in this case) doe become active and mobilize money and centralize policies becuase of beliefs about the world and their relationship to it, and not just because of economic development. More thorough analyses are needed, of course, but this evidence lends some credibility to the theory of centralization presented here.

Conclusions

The notion that ideas matter, that societies change their structure of power and decision-making because of changing perceptions and norms, has one final important implication for the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations. The literature on intergovernmental relations is filled with characterizations of intergovernmental relations as co-operative and pragmatic.[57] This is said to be true because everyone is reacting to common problems and seeking joint resources which use the resources of all the effected levels. This co-operative behavior is because the political system is simply reacting to problems of matching political scale with economic scale, and trying to deal with complexity and interdepence, almost as if the officials at different levels are one large management team, co-ordinating their activities with agreed on values.

The implication of the theory presented here is that to the extent changes from theistic to individualistic to socio-economic environmental causal theories are not evenly experienced across subunits of American society, centralization will not be co-operative, but conflict-ridden, because centralization will be in the pursuit of objectives and programs which fundamentally clash with notions of whom should be responsible for humans, and how much obligation government should HAVE in providing for individuals. It is in this area that this theory also seems superior to the economic development perspective, for it offers a reason why attempts to centrally direct policy have been the source of such extensive conflicts.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the theoretical issue involved here is only part of a larger question in political science: is policy in a society a result of man's conceptions of the proper role of government and of man's relationship to his environment and government, or is it a function of economic determinism. The argument here is that man is not some passive creature just passing wealth into policy in some invariant, mechanical way, but that there are real political struggles derived from ideas which influence policy.

Footnotes

1. A general discussion of the value of decentralization is contained in L.J. Sharpe, "Theories and Values of Local Government," Political Studies, Vol. 18 (June, 1970) 153-74; for an example of this argument, see James L. Buckley, "The Trouble with Federalism," Commensense, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer, 1978) 10-17.

2. Kenneth Newton, "Feeble Governments and Private Power," in Louis Masotti and Robert Lineberry, The New Urban Politics, (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1976), 37-58.

3. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden, 1960, 1975), pp 20-45.

4. There is also something to be said for the idea that the representational system is a key attribute of federalism. See Heinz Eulau, "Polarity in Representational Federalism: A Neglected Theme of Federalism," Publius, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall, 1973) 153-71.

5. Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970)

6. Studies of changes in functional assignment are contained in Joseph Zimmerman's study published by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Pragmatic Federalism: The Reassignment of Functional Responsibility (Washington, D.C., 1976) M-105; and G. Ross Stephens, "State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy," Journal of Politics, Vol. 36, (Feb., 1974) 52-66.

7. This is discussed in Stonecash, "Centralization and Interaction in State-Local Fiscal Relations," unpublished.

8. Joseph Fl Zimmerman, "The Politics of State mandates on Local Government," 1977 Northeast Political Science Association Meetings; for an analysis of how such mandates effect local policy, see Thomas A. Kochan and Hoyt N. Wheeler, "Municipal Collective Bargaining," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (October, 1975) 46-66.

9. This notion is expressed well by Jeffrey Pressman, Federal Programs and City Politics (Berkeley: University of California, 1975) and is illustrated by Helen Ingram, "Policy Implementation Through Bargaining: The Case of Federal Grants-in-Aid, Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Fall, 1977) 499-526.

10. Samuel H. Beer, "The Modernization of American Federalism," Publius, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall, 1973) 49-95.

11. Ibid., 51-52

12. Ibid., 54

13. Ibid., 54-56

14. Ibid., 57

15. Vincent Ostrum, Charles Tiebout, and Robert Warren, "The Organization of Government in Urban Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (Dec., 1961) 831-42; Robert B. Hawkins, Self Government By District (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976); and Robert Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas (Chicago: Markham Series in Public Policy Analysis, 1971) All use this logic. Daniel Elazar, The American Partnership (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960) Also mentions this kind of change as one reason for change in governmental arrangements, p. 323.

16. William B. Moul, "On Getting Something for Nothing: A Note on Causal Models of Political Development," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, (July, 1974) 139-64, summarizes many of these criticisms.

17. A general critique of the theory and methodology of studies which use levels of wealth is contained in Stonecash, "Politics Wealth and Public Policy," scheduled for publication in a symposium of Policy Studies Journal, Summer, 1979. A fuller critique is contained in a longer version in the author's possession.

18. He develops this thesis in "Modernization," Publius, and it runs through several other analyses, including "The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing," Public Policy, Vol. 24, No.2 (Spring, 1976) 127-95; "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 1 (March, 1978) 9-21; and "Political Overload and Federalism," Polity, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Fall, 1977) 5-17.

19. Rufus Davis, "The 'Federal Principle' Reconsidered," in Aaron Wildavsky, American Federalism in Perspective, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 9-10; and William Riker, "Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance," in American Federalism in Perspective, 53-56.

20. Beer, "Modernization," 90

21. This perspective is argued by Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley: University of California, 1975) pp 15-24.

22. This section is heavily influenced by Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: Free Press, 1968)

23. Robert Wuthnow, The Consciouness Reformation (Berkeley: University of California, 1976) Vii. He discusses the different "meaning systems" presented here and their implications very clearly in pp. 82-135.

24. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State (New York: Free Press, 1974) 15-28.

25. Chambers, "An Historical Perspective on Political Action vs Individualized Treatment," 77-94.

26. Beer, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," pp 9-10

27. Riker, "Federalism," 53-56

28. William S. Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of Federalism," in A. Wildavsky, American Federalism in Perspective, pp 37-40.

29. These conflicting pressures and their theoretical presentation are clearly summarized by Mamidipudi Venkatrangaiya, Some Theories of Federalism (Ganeshkhind: University of Poona, 1971).

30. Irvin G. Wylie, The Self-Made Man in America, (New York: Free Press, 1955, 1966). p 21

31. The tendency to take action on these kinds of projects is evident throughout Daniel J. Elazar, The American Partnership (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960)

32. This did not discourage repeated efforts by reform groups to change individuals, for individualistic views often lead to beliefs that individual qualities were sometimes deficient and in need of change.

33. This change in belief systems generated considerable debate and change in social work. See Clarke A. Chambers, "An Historical Perspective on Political Action vs Individualized Treatment," in Paul Weinberger, Perspectives on Social Welfare, Second Edition, (New York: MacMillan, 1974) 77-94.

34. Wuthnow, Conscious Reformation, 136-53. The individualistic is still very strong in America. See Paul M. Sniderman and Richard A. Brody, " Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance," American Journal of Political Science (August, 1977) 501-23.

35. Robert Bremner, "Shifting Attitudes," in Weinberger, Perspectives on Social Welfare, 64-77.

36. The idea of collective "Reality-Testing" is discussed by Etzioni, The Active Society, 155-71. The traumatic effect of the Depression on conventional beliefs is shown in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of The Old Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). An analysis of the effect of the unemployment experienced during that time are contained in Sidney Verba and Kay L. Scholzman, "Unemployment, Class Consciousness and Radical Politics," Journal of Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2 (May, 1977) 291-322.

37. Daniel Elazar, American Federalism (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1972), p. 32.

38. The way in which federalism slows down policy achievement is shown in Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants; and Ingram, "Policy Implementation Through Bargaining."

39. Beer, "Modernization," 58.

40. The limits to additive models and there presumed invariance of relationship are discussed in Stonecash, "Local Policy Analysis and Autonomy: On Intergovernmental Relations and Theory Specification," Comparative Urban Research, Vol. 5, Nos. 2 and 3 (1978), 5-23.

41. It seems that it could also be possible to include additive terms for each term, since a change in any of these for a constant positive value of any others may also produce a change in centralization. There are several alternatives possible here which still allow the idea of conditionality.

42. Beer, "Modernization," mentions secularization characteristics throughout his analysis, but only explicitly regards them as important in the technocratic stage. p. 75. The role of secularization is given more attention and significance in David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965) p. 94.

43. An attempt to develop a theory of the variations in form this activity will take is made in Stonecash, "The Sources of Intergovernmental Activity: Interpreting Variation," paper presented at World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, Sweden, August 14-19, 1978.

44. This plague the works of Bish, Hawkins, and Ostrum, et.al., indicated in footnote 15.

45. Oliver Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Centralization in Metropolitan Areas," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, (Dec. 1967) 299-310.

46. Beer, "Modernization," p. 79, also presumes professionals push for centralization to achieve uniformity, but he seems to assume that uniformity is result of technocratic desires and not mass political desires.

47. This can be more formally stated as the differences in the following models: economic development: economic development → professionalization → centralization ; beliefs:



48. Beer, "The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing," p. 130.

49. Ibid., pp. 128-29.

50. Ibid., qp. 175-77. The effect of conservative and liberal dominance is also shown in Demetrics Caraley, "Congressional Political and Urban Aid," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 1 (Spring, 1976) pp. 19-45.

51. Elazar, American Federalism, 90-126.

52. David Fairbanks, "Religious Forces and Morality" Policies in the American States," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September, 1977), pp. 414-16.

53. Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note," Polity, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall, 1969), pp. 77-83.

54. Charles A. Johnson, "Political Culture in American States: Elazar's Formulation Examined," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August, 1976) 501-07.

55. John D. Hutcheson, Jr., and George A. Taylor "Religious Variables, Political System Characteristics, and Policy Outcomes in the American States," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May, 1973) 419-20.

56. Frederick Wirt, "Policy as Value, Region, and History in the American States: The Case of Education," delivered at Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, Illinois, April, 1978. Johnson, "Political Culture in American States," presents some findings contradictory to the culture thesis (though compatible with Elazar), pp. 502-03, in that he finds the moralitic-interventionist culture has a negative correlation with percent of local revenue from state government (indicating autonomous local governments) but his other findings on this are conflicting. The only other study of the correlates of state centralization is that of Thomas Kochan, "Correlates of State Public Employee Bargaining Laws," Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3 (October, 1973), pp. 322-35. He finds that extent of state specification of local bargaining practices had a high

association with income levels and innovativeness. He did not include cultural variables. Finally, it is important to note that with all these tests, the theoretical statement of this analysis that economic development has an effect only if (beliefs are a necessary condition, or an interaction terms) certain belief systems exist is not really tested. The tests are always controlling for one or the other. The only test which does this is Fairbanks, "Religious Forces," p. 417, in which he examines the effect of economic development on liquor and gambling laws within the separate subsets of states with high, medium, and low proportions of conservative protestants. He finds that only in the states with a low proportion of conservative protestants is economic development related to easing of restrictions, which supports the notion that ideas (their absence in this case) are influential in whether economic development has effects.

57. Elazar, American Federalism; Parris Glendening and Mavis Reeves, Pragmatic Federalism (Pacific Palisades, 1976)